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Abstract 
 
We present a model where increasing employee participation in stock option scheme 
leads to higher performance but with a cost to shareholders. We show that firms with 
higher market values per employee are more likely to have option schemes and they offer 
stock options to a broader group of employees. The model yields empirical predictions that 
are consistent with the stock option boom of late 1990s and their reduced popularity after 
the stock market downfall.  
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On the Relationship Between Stock Option Compensation and Equity Values: a Note 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The use of equity compensation schemes, such as employee stock ownership plans or broad-based 
stock options, has increased substantially during the past 20 years or so (Blasi et al., 2003). 
Consequently, there has appeared a number of papers to explain the firm-level determinants of the 
use of these schemes (e.g. Kruse, 1996; Core and Guay, 2001; Ittner et al., 2003). In this note, we 
contribute to this literature by proposing a novel hypothesis on how the market value of the firm 
relative to the number of employees is related to the allocation of equity incentives.     
Our argument is that stock options are less expensive to use in firms where the market 
value per employee is high. The model is based on the idea that even when employee participation 
in equity compensation schemes may be good for performance, increased participation also implies 
increased dilution costs to shareholder, and therefore it may be in the interest of shareholders to 
limit participation in the program. However, with the same relative increases in share prices, firms 
with higher absolute levels of market value per employee are able to offer the same incentives with 
lower dilution than those with lower levels of market value per employee. This hypothesis has 
testable empirical implications both at the level of the firm and the stock exchange.  
  
2 The model 
There are two time periods in the model, 0 and 1. MV0 and MV1 denote market values of 
equity at time 0 and 1, respectively, S0 and S1 denote the number of shares at respective points of 
time, and Opt0 denotes the number of options the firm distributes at time 0. The options are 
distributed free of charge. There are two types of players in the model. Share holders own S0 shares 
(all the shares at time 0) and control the decision-making, so an option scheme diluting their 
ownership share can only be made with their consent. The option holders are a subset of employees, 
to whom to share holders decide to grant options. The option holders can exchange one option for 
one share at time 1 for a price of
1
0
S
MV
, which is paid to the shareholders. The number of shares at 
time 1 equals the initial number of shares plus the shares subscribed by options if the market value 
at time 1 exceeds the market value at time 0 (S1 = S0 + Opt0 if MV1 > MV0 ). In the case where the 
market value at time 1 equals or is lower than market value at time 0 ( 01 MVMV ≤ ), option holders 
do not want to exercise their options and the number of shares is the same at both times (S1 = S0). 
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In the case where the market value increases (MV1 > MV0), the pay-off for option holders 
collectively is )( 01
1
01 MVMV
S
SS −− . The shareholders, in turn, receive ).( 01
1
0 MVMV
S
S −  If MV1 
equals MV0 or is lower, then the option holders do not exercise their options and their gain is 0.      
In our model we assume that higher participation rates are related to higher levels of 
performance with a concave function. To motivate the concavity of the performance function, 
suppose that the stock option schemes are always filled in the order of hierarchical position, 
beginning from the top of the organization. The concavity implies that the marginal performance 
impact decreases when new, lower-level employees enter the scheme.  The concave shape of the 
function is supported by the standard notion that stock option schemes provide stronger incentives 
to managers whose actions can have higher impact on share prices.  
We assume that shareholders expect higher employee participation rates to be associated 
with higher performance, measured by the growth of the firm market value. The participation rate 
(π) is the ratio between the number of persons participating to the scheme (N) and the total number 
of employees (L) and is thus given by the expression: 
L
N=π       (1) 
In the following, we are going to assume that the number of employees is fixed, so that the 
choice variable is the number of persons participation to the scheme (N). 
Assume that the higher performance from higher participation rate (π) translates into higher 
share returns (r), so that the participation rate π is one of the arguments determining the growth of 
the market value. The increase in share price during this period includes a random component ε and 
a component attributable to a higher performance due to the stock option scheme, depending on the 
participation rate π.  The relationship between the growth of the market value and participation rate 
is represented by a concave function: 
   0,0,),( 001 <>=− πππεπ rrMVrMVMV    (2) 
 We augment expression (2) by noting that the growth of the market value is not going 
to depend only on the existence of the option plan, but the plan has to be sizable enough to give 
meaningful incentives to each employee. We assume that for each employee there is a minimum 
threshold of option incentives that has to be reached before they have any effect. To keep things 
simple, we assume that once this threshold is reached firm market value increases by a certain 
amount as stipulated in expression (2) and that further increases in option incentives do not increase 
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market value. Equity incentives below the threshold do not produce any effect on market value. The 
optimal amount of stock options for a given individual is either equal to the threshold or zero.  
 The expected gain of an option holder is the expected growth rate in market value 
(E(r)) times the market value at time 0, multiplied by the size of his holdings relative to the total 
stock outstanding (
1
1
S
si ). If E (r) is zero or negative then no option scheme will be launched. 
Assume that the threshold level required for the incentive effects can be written as a fraction βi of 
the wages, and βi is assumed to be equal for all employees (  1i i ,...,N .β β= ∀ = ). Thus, we have the 
following expression: 
i
i wMVrE
S
s β=0
1
1 )( , E(r) > 0, 0 < β < 1.   (3) 
To abstract from subjective valuations of options, assume that both employees and 
outside investors are risk neutral and share the same expectations about the development of share 
price. Next, we will derive the relationship between total dilution and participation rate.  
 Recall that employees will join the option scheme in order of their hierarchical 
position in firm organization. Assuming that there is a positive, monotonic relationship between 
wages and hierarchical position, we find that the sum of wages  must be a concave function: when 
we start summing up wages from the top of the firm organization, W(N) increases, but each addition 
is smaller or equal than the previous one, since we add employees with lower hierarchical position. 
Although the number of employees is discrete, we can approximate the sum of wages as a 
continuous function and thus write it as an integral of individual wages:   
0,0,)()(
1
<>= ∫ NNNN WWdxxwNW    (4) 
 
 
Using (3) and (4), we can now write the total dilution as a function of N:  
01
01
)),((
)(
MVrE
NW
S
SS
επ
β=−   where E(r) > 0   and 
N
S
SS
∂
−∂
1
01
>0. (5) 
 
Note that if the denominator would increase faster than the numerator in the expression (5), then 
increasing the number of participants in the stock option program would actually decrease the total 
dilution. In such a case, increasing participation rate would always be optimal. However, we 
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concentrate on the more interesting case and assume that the dilution is always strictly increasing in 
the number of participants.  
 
The shareholders’ problem is then to choose the optimal participation rate (π) knowing that 
increasing the number of participants in the stock option program increases share returns but it also 
increases the costs of the program in the form of dilution. This can be written as 
 
0
1
0 ),((max MVrE
S
S εππ    (6) 
 
Substituting from (5) we obtain 
  
 )()),((max 0 NWMVrE βεππ −   (7) 
Taking the first order conditions of (7) with respect to π and rearranging we obtaini 
 
N
W
L
MV
rE βπ =0)(    (8) 
 
The left-hand side of the expression (8) can be interpreted as the marginal benefit 
from increasing the participation rate, while the right-hand side may be interpreted as marginal cost 
of increasing the number of participants to the stock option scheme (dilution effect). Regarding the 
optimal participation rate π*, four different cases can be distinguished: 
1) The marginal cost of including the first employee (top manager) to the scheme is 
larger than the marginal benefit, and the marginal cost of including additional employees to the 
scheme increases faster than the marginal benefit. More formally: 
NWL
MV
rE βπ <0)(  for N = 1 and NNWL
MV
rE βππ <2 0)(  
In this case, the optimal participation rate is clearly zero, since it does not pay to include the first 
employee, and second derivative shows that the costs of the scheme exceed the benefits for all other 
employees as well. 
 2) The marginal cost of including the top manager to the scheme is larger than the 
marginal benefit, but the marginal benefits increase faster than marginal costs: 
NWL
MV
rE βπ <0)(  for N = 1 and NNWL
MV
rE βππ >2 0)(  
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In this case, the expression (8) does not give the maximum gain from an option scheme but rather 
the minimum where the losses from the scheme are largest. Thus initially the total cost of the 
scheme exceeds the total benefits. However, once the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost 
the net cost of the scheme starts to fall, and each additional employee has a positive impact on the 
profitability of the scheme (this follows from the assumptions of strict concavity). The optimal 
participation rate is 1 if the expected outcome under full participation is larger than expected 
outcome under no participation (i.e. 00 ),0(()()),(( MVrELWMVLrE εβε >− ), and 0 in the reverse 
case.   
 3) The marginal cost of including the top manager to the scheme is smaller than the 
marginal benefit, but the marginal costs increase faster than marginal benefits: 
NWL
MV
rE βπ >0)(  for N = 1 and NNWL
MVrE βππ <2 0)(  
This is the case where an interior solution to the equality (8) is likely to appear, unless the marginal 
benefit of including the last employee exceeds marginal cost (i.e. NWL
MV
rE βπ >0)(  for all N ≤  
L.) , in which case the optimal participation rate is 1. Thus the optimal participation rate in this case 
is between 
L
1  and 1 (endpoints included). 
 4) The marginal cost of including the top manager to the scheme is smaller than the 
marginal benefit, and the marginal benefits increase faster than marginal costs: 
NWL
MV
rE βπ >0)(  for N = 1 and NNWL
MV
rE βππ >2 0)(  
For reasons stated above, it is clear that in this case the optimal participation rate is 1. 
  
The different cases are summarised in Table 1. It is noteworthy that an interior solution is observed 
only in the case 3). However, since we often observe interior solutions in practice, this is perhaps 
the most relevant case.  
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
Finally, we show that higher market values per employee increase participation rates. 
Using the implicit function rule 
πδ
δπ
F
F
L
MV
L
MV0
0
* −=  we obtain from (8) 
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NNWL
MVrE
rE
βππ
π
−
−
2
0)(
)(
   (9) 
 
Let us first discuss the case where π* has an interior solution. We know that this can only happen 
when the marginal cost increases faster than the marginal benefit, so the denominator in (9) must be 
negative and therefore the expression (9) is positive. Thus, an increase in market value per 
employee increases the optimal participation rate π*. 
 If  π* = 0 (case 1 or 2), an increase in 
L
MV0  increases the probability that it pays to 
include the top manager into the scheme (i.e. NWL
MV
rE βπ >0)(  for N = 1), so that the regime 
would shift from 1 to 3 and from 2 to 4. In other words, the likelihood that a firm not having an 
option scheme would adopt one increases when 
L
MV0  increases. Moreover, in the case 2 an 
increase in 
L
MV0  would reduce π*. Since π* is in this case a minimum, this means that the total 
gains from option scheme would increase and the likelihood of adopting a scheme would increase, 
even if the firm remains at regime 2.   
 Finally, if  π* = 1 (case 4) an increase in 
L
MV0 cannot increase the participation rate 
since it is already at maximum.  
 
3 Conclusion   
Our results suggest that the use of option compensation should be related to the firm market value 
per employee. This finding has interesting empirical implications. First, at the firm level those firms 
having higher market value per employee are more likely to use stock options in their compensation 
package. They are also more likely to target options to broader group of employees. Second, our 
model fits well the common observation that broad-based stock options became common during the 
stock market upheaval of the late 1990s. It also predicts that during stock market downturns, firms 
target their stock options to a more select group of employees and some firms cease to issue options 
altogether. There is preliminary evidence from the Finnish stock market supporting these 
hypotheses (Jones et al., 2004). Our results suggest that future research would benefit by paying 
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more attention to the role of equity values as potential determinants of the use of equity 
compensation.    
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Table 1. The determination of optimal participation ratio 
 
 
NNWL
MV
rE βππ <2 0)(  NNWL
MV
rE βππ >2 0)(  
NWL
MV
rE βπ <0)(  for N = 1 π* = 0 π* = 0 or π* = 1 
NWL
MV
rE βπ >0)( fpr N = 1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡∈ 1,1*
L
π  π* = 1 
 
 
 
                                                 
i Notice that in differentiating the wage function we used the expression (1) and the chain rule dW / dπ=( dW / dN) *  
(dN / dπ).  
 
 
